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FANTASIES AND FACTS: EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
AND METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  
ON FIRST - AND THIRD - PERSON 
PERSPECTIVES 
I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist 
between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the 
conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. 
I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödinger, that one cannot simply reduce data 
from the first-person perspective to third-person data, without remainder, especially 
when the very subject matter of the science includes the first-person perspective. 
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In philosophical and scientific discussions of consciousness one often finds 
a distinction made between first-person and third-person perspectives. 
Indeed, traditional and contemporary definitions of the mind-body problem, 
the “hard” problem, or the problem of the explanatory gap have often 
been framed by this distinction. Scientific objectivity, it is said, requires a 
detached, third-person approach to observable phenomena, and we have 
such access to things in the environment, some of which are brains. Brain 
science depends on taking a third-person perspective. In contrast, we have 
direct knowledge of our own experience only in a first-person perspective, 
but this is thought to be too subjective to generate scientific data. Thus 
Daniel Dennett (2001) has remarked: “First-person science of consciousness 
is a discipline with no methods, no data, no results, no future, no promise. 
It will remain a fantasy”. If this is so, then the problem is clear. Seemingly 
there can be no science of consciousness per se since (1) consciousness is 
intrinsically first-person; and (2) any attempt to explain something that is 
first-person in third-person terms distorts or fails to capture what it tries to 
explain. Furthermore, (3) first-person phenomenology cannot be a science of 
consciousness, if in science there is only room for third-person data. I want 
to review here two aspects of this problem. The first is methodological, the 
second is epistemological. 
One methodological proposal is to reduce the first-person perspective 
to third-person data and to integrate it with other third-person 
data from experimental science. This is a strategy that Dennett calls 
“heterophenomenology” (1991, 2001). Heterophenomenology itself, however, 
involves something of a fantasy, to use the term that Dennett applies to first-
person science. The fantasy here is that science can leave the first-person 
perspective behind, or neutralize it without remainder. First-person data are 
supposedly averaged out in statistical summaries, and treated as third-person 
facts. According to this approach, a fact would be, not the first-person datum 
“The subject experiences X”, but the third-person datum “The subject reports 
that she experiences X”. This fact is then to be interpreted and analyzed using 
pre-established categories. Dennett suggests that it should be interpreted as 
a text or a piece of narrative. So, for example, one question would be, what do 
people usually mean when they say that they experience X. But it is just here 
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that one can see how this procedure is actually naïve, and ultimately non-
scientific. In attempting to say something about consciousness (or specifically 
about the experience X), heterophenomenology fails to acknowledge that its 
interpretations of first-person reports must be based, in part1, and ultimately, 
on either the scientist’s own first-person experience (what he understands 
from his own experience to be the experience of X), or upon pre-established 
(and seemingly objective) categories that are, however, ultimately derived 
from folk psychology or from an obscure, anonymous, and certainly non-
methodological phenomenology2. The intentional stance required for the 
scientist’s interpretation of the subject’s report is not itself something that 
has come under scientific controls; it is thus infected, directly or indirectly, 
by the first-person perspective (see Gallagher 1997, 2003a). 
A different methodological approach is to take the first-person perspective 
seriously and to seek out methodological controls that can apply to that data. One 
version of this approach is Francisco Varela’s notion of “neurophenomenology”. 
As it has been employed in recent experiments this involves training 
experimental subjects to develop their own report categories, and then using 
those categories as an analytic tool for the interpretation of data (see Lutz et al. 
2002, and Lutz 2002). A related approach, “frontloaded phenomenology” involves 
using phenomenological insights that have already been worked out in a formal 
analysis of the sort found in the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
or other phenomenologists, as the basis for experimental design (Gallagher 2003a; 
Gallagher and Brøsted Sørensen 2006; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008). 
Let me discuss just one example of this latter approach. The example is drawn 
from experiments that have already been performed (Blakemore and Decety 
2001; Decety and Grèzes 1999; Jeannerod 1997; Ruby and Decety 2001; and 
other studies reviewed by Grèzes and Decety 2001). The phenomenological 
insight, however, would suggest a revised experimental design. This 
example also relies on the distinction between first-person and third-person 
perspectives (see Gallagher 2003b for further discussion). 
A number of brain areas (including the supplementary motor area, the dorsal 
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pre-motor cortex, the supramarginal gyrus, and the superior parietal lobe) 
are activated when a subject 
• Engages in intentional action 
• Observes others engaging in such action 
• Consciously simulates (or imagines) performing such action 
• Or prepares to imitate such action 
Certain of the same brain areas are activated under all of these conditions. 
The experiments that have established these intriguing shared neuronal 
representations suggest that the overlapping activations of brain areas 
constitute an important part of how we come to understand others. We 
activate parts of our own motor and cognitive systems in a simulative way, 
and this neural reverberation may be a partial basis for insight into what the 
other person’s experience is like. 
Some of these same brain areas are activated under one or two of the 
conditions, but not under all of them. These non-overlapping areas are also 
of importance, however. Jeannerod (2001) proposed that the non-overlapping 
areas may account for our ability to distinguish our own activities from 
those of others, and thus may contribute to a sense of self-agency (also see 
Jeannerod et al. 2003; Ruby and Decety 2001). 
The brain-imaging experiments that help to establish these facts are based on 
important operational definitions of first-person perspective and third-person 
perspective worked out in an influential paper by Barresi and Moore (1996). 
First-person perspective: Subjects are asked to imagine themselves 
performing a given action, for example, reaching to grasp a glass. 
Third-person perspective: Subjects are asked to imagine the 
experimenter performing the same action. 
At this point, however, a closer phenomenological analysis suggests some 
qualifications that should have been, but were not considered in the 
experimental designs. Attending first to the definition of the first-person 
perspective, one can distinguish phenomenologically (that is, by appealing to 
one’s own possible experiences) between 
First-person/egocentric perspective: I am located here, and I imagine 
moving my hand to grasp the glass in front of me. 
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First-person/allocentric perspective: I imagine myself sitting over 
there, and I can visually imagine how that person, who happens to be 
me, would reach to pick up a glass that is nearby. 
Likewise, for the third-person perspective, it is possible to distinguish 
between 
Third-person/allocentric perspective: I imagine seeing her over 
there reaching for the glass. 
Third-person/egocentric perspective: I imagine being over there in 
her place doing the action “from the inside”3. 
Since there were no controls for these distinctions in the experiments, it 
seems likely that the original experimental results and their interpretations 
require some qualification. When subjects are asked to simulate (or 
imagine) an action from the first-person perspective (or third-person 
perspective) do we know whether they are taking an allocentric or 
egocentric perspective, and is neural activation the same or different 
across these different perspectives? Employing these phenomenological 
distinctions and answering this question may help to make the concept of 
neuronal simulation and the differentiation between self-agency and other-
agency more precise. 
These phenomenological distinctions are based on the possibility of an 
imaginative variation – that is, the fact that I can rehearse these various 
perspectives in my own experience (see Froese and Gallagher 2010). But this 
points to a further complication. The complication involves what we might 
call the primary first-person framework that structures all of a subject’s 
experience. That is, in all cases, even in the third-person allocentric 
framework, I am the one doing the imaginative enactment – third-person 
perspectives are still accomplished within the first-person framework of 
my own experience. One might say that there is something it is like to be 
imaginatively enacting an action from a third-person perspective. I never 
lose track of who is simulating and who is simulated? A more basic first-
person framework seems to define the very possibility of taking a third-
person point of view. 
3 Farrer and Frith (2002) claim that this is not possible: “it is not possible to represent 
the actions of others in the egocentric coordinates used for generating our own actions” 
(p. 601). It is not clear to me why this is impossible. 
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This point about a more basic first-person framework is an epistemological 
issue that can be taken back to our original problem about the possibility of 
doing a science of consciousness. Science is always accomplished by scientists 
who occupy, by necessity, their own first-person perspective. They take up a 
third-person perspective from within the perspective of the first-person. 
It is clear that this is not a new issue, and that it has been well debated 
before. Schrödinger and Carnap, for example, in the 1930s, took up this 
issue on opposite sides4. Schrödinger maintained that science depends on 
a “fundamental axiom” which is neither empirically testable nor simply a 
matter of convention. He formulates this axiom in a way that points to both 
the irreducibility of the first-person perspective and the unavoidability of 
the second-person (intersubjective) perspective in the practice of science, 
and he calls it “Hypothesis P”, where P stands for the personality of the 
scientists. Hypothesis P can be stated in this way: I am not the only one who 
has experiences (including thoughts, feelings, memories etc.); others also 
have them5. In doing science, however, scientists are required to ignore this 
axiom. One is required to conduct science as if there is only a third-person 
perspective. 
The scientist subconsciously, almost inadvertently, simplifies the
problem of understanding Nature by disregarding or cutting out of
the picture to be constructed, himself, his own personality, the
subject of cognizance. (Schrödinger 1967, p. 90)
Despite this methodological elimination of the first-and second-person, 
“science in its totality depends on Hypothesis P”. The scandal (although 
Schrödinger rightly says it is not a scandal, but simply the way it is) is that 
science is accomplished by human beings who live lives that are ultimately 
non-scientific. On Schrödinger’s view, Hypothesis P cannot be subjected to 
scientific investigation. 
Carnap accepts some version of Hypothesis P. He concludes his 1936 
response to Schrödinger in this way: “All the premises on which science 
depends, when they are not purely conventional in nature, rest on 
experience”. More importantly, however, Carnap believed that Hypothesis 
2.
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P, at least the version that is genuinely presupposed in scientific research, is 
subject to scientific examination. Specifically, he suggests, the fact that other 
persons have experiences is testable on the assumption that there are exact 
relational laws that link mental states and observable behaviors6. 
As far as I can see, however, this still leaves in play the first-person 
experience on which we base our understanding of what these behaviours 
mean. This is not the place to consider whether the first-person or the 
second-person perspective has priority, or to discuss contemporary theory 
of mind approaches to such questions (see Gallagher and Zahavi 2008). 
The point that we want to make here, however, follows Carnap’s idea that 
“all the premises on which science depends … rest on experience”, and 
still in some way experience itself is subject to scientific investigation. 
This epistemological claim, however, leads us back once again to the 
methodological issues of precisely how science can study first-person 
experience. 
Both the epistemological and the methodological considerations suggest 
that there is no easy resolution to this problem, or at least, no solution 
that will gain easy consensus. But this debate is philosophically central to 
understanding the nature of science, especially when we are attempting a 
science of consciousness, which is the scientific investigation of experience. 
One cannot simply reduce data from the first-person perspective to 
third-person data, without remainder, since not only is there always an 
experiencing scientist and in many cases an experimental subject, but, 
when the science is the science of consciousness, the very subject matter of 
the science includes the first person perspective. In the case of the science 
of consciousness, this makes Hypothesis P an explicit fact that cannot be 
ignored. To ignore the first-person perspective that is implicit in all attempts 
to take the third-person perspective may be a perfectly acceptable, and 
even necessary way to do physics. But to try to ignore the first-person 
perspective or to fail to take it seriously in its own terms, when what is at 
stake is consciousness – that is, precisely first-person experience – and to be 
satisfied with the idea that one can reduce this to third-person data – is to be 
unscientific. Science cannot ignore the facts, and the facts of the matter in 
this case are facts of the first-person perspective. 
6 As Bitbol (1999) points out Carnap borrows an argument from Neurath, based on 
the latter’s “social behaviourism”. For Carnap, it is legitimate to infer that someone 
possesses feelings, thoughts, memories and perceptions on the basis of a “determinate 
exterior behaviour”.
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To think that science can be exclusively a third-person procedure is itself 
something of an epistemological fantasy. To paraphrase Dennett, in a 
way that apparently would be unacceptable to him: a purely third-person 
science of consciousness is a discipline with inadequate methods that fail 
to capture the data of consciousness. By definition, it necessarily produces 
impoverished results. It is not good science, but simply the fantasy of a 
science. 
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